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X-WR-CALNAME:IIEP UBA-CONICET
X-ORIGINAL-URL:https://economicas.uba.ar/iiep
X-WR-CALDESC:Eventos para IIEP UBA-CONICET
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TZID:America/Argentina/Buenos_Aires
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TZOFFSETFROM:-0300
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DTSTART:20250101T000000
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DTSTART;TZID=America/Argentina/Buenos_Aires:20260826T130000
DTEND;TZID=America/Argentina/Buenos_Aires:20260826T143000
DTSTAMP:20260810T163552Z
CREATED:20260810T163151Z
LAST-MODIFIED:20260810T163552Z
UID:24717-1787749200-1787754600@economicas.uba.ar
SUMMARY:Seminario de Investigación | Experimental Evidence on Partisan Bias in Macroeconomic Forecasts
DESCRIPTION:Experimental Evidence on Partisan Bias in Macroeconomic Forecasts \nExpositor | Diego Marino Fages \nAbstract  \nRising political polarization may affect a key input for policy: household macroeconomic expectations. I study whether political preferences shape forecasts of inflation\, unemployment\, and exchange rates in an online experiment during Argentina’s 2023 presidential election (N=1\,162). The design exogenously varies accuracy incentives and information about current indicators. Accuracy incentives reduce gaps in candidate-contingent reported forecasts\, especially for the black market exchange rate and unemployment. Information provision reduces forecast dispersion but has weaker effects on partisan gaps. The findings have implications for the design of expectations surveys and for their use in disciplining models of belief formation\, disagreement\, and policy transmission. \nLugar | FCE-UBA | Aula Olivera
URL:https://economicas.uba.ar/iiep/eventos/experimental-evidence-on-partisan-bias-in-macroeconomic-forecasts/
CATEGORIES:Destacada,Seminario IIEP
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